5
satisfaction or their non-compliance with an ultimatum and the enforcement of sanctions.
(d.) The Naval Commander-in-Chief should be given authority to use his aircraft for Naval and Military purposes not merely at Shanghai, but to reconnoitre the forts on the Yangtse and anywhere in China within the range of their flight.
(e.) The military importance of recommendation (d) should be impressed. on the British Minister at Peking and the Consul-General at Shanghai.
(f.) In view of the uncertainties of the situation, the immediate with- drawal of all British nationals from the Yangtse is recommended, and we suggest that the other countries concerned should be urged to order a similar withdrawal.
(g.) From a military point of view there are advantages in making any demand in regard to Nanking to the Nationalist Government rather than to the Chinese Military Commander-in-Chief.
(h.) We adhere to our previous recommendation that, if possible, reliance should be placed on Japan for the protection of British and international interests North of the River Yangtse. If this is impossible we should be glad to have further political guidance in regard to the importance which His Majesty's Government attach to the retention of Peking and Tientsin. For the local protection of the international concessions at Tientsin the minimum reinforcement should be one mixed Brigade, but this does not allow for the maintenance of communications (over 30 miles long) to the sea or for the protection of the Legation at Peking."
11. The Report referred to in the preceding paragraph was examined by the Cabinet at a meeting held the same day at 4:30 P.M. (Cabinet 23 (27)), when the following Conclusions were reached :--
"(a.) To approve the immediate despatch of the following telegrams:-
To Peking
To Paris
To Rome
No. 235
No. 77
To Washington
No. 158
No. 95
No. 73
(Appendix I*)
To Tokyo
195
the effect of which is to concur in identical representations by the Powers concerned to the Chinese Nationalist Government, on the lines proposed by their Ministers at Peking, subject to—
(i.) In order to avoid humiliating General Chiang Kai-shek, who, according to latest reports, was becoming more friendly, the demands should be made to the Nationalist Government at Hankow, a copy being given to the General by the Consular authorities at Shanghai:
(ii.) The acceptance being on the understanding that the other Powers concerned would take their share in sanctions, allowance being made for time for the Japanese Government to extricate their nationals, which they were asked to do without delay:
(iii.) The plans for sanctions being remitted to the Admirals commanding
the Fleets of the Powers in China.
(b.) That the above telegram No. 235 to Peking should be repeated to the Naval Commander-in-Chief, China Station.
(c.) To approve generally the Conclusions of the Committee of Chiefs of Staff in C.P.-115 (27).†
(d.) That the Admiralty should be responsible for instructing the Naval Commander-in-Chief, in accordance with the Report of the Committee of
* Reproduced as Annexure No. 1 to this Paper.
† Also C.I.D. Paper No. 787-B. See paragraph 10 above.
No comments yet.
Private notes are available after approval.